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ABSTRACT
Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers
in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence
of third-party data providers on mechanism design. When no data
provider is present, it has been shown that simple mechanisms are
“good enough” — they can achieve a constant fraction of the revenue
of optimal mechanisms. The results in this paper demonstrate that
this is no longer true in the presence of a third-party data provider
who can provide the bidder with a signal that is correlated with
the item type. Specifically, even with a single seller, a single bidder,
and a single item of uncertain type for sale, the strategies of pricing
each item-type separately (the analog of item pricing for multi-
item auctions) and bundling all item-types under a single price (the
analog of grand bundling) can both simultaneously be a logarithmic
factor worse than the optimal revenue. Further, in the presence of a
data provider, item-type partitioning mechanisms—a more general
class of mechanisms which divide item-types into disjoint groups
and offer prices for each group—still cannot achieve within a log log
factor of the optimal revenue. Thus, our results highlight that the
presence of a data-provider forces the use of more complicated
mechanisms in order to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal
revenue.
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